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"Two men looked out from behind pri
son bars. One saw the mud; the other saw
the stars."
In this anonymous couplet, the orator
sees the law that impression precedes and
determines expression, while the psychol
ogist sees the law that apperception pre
cedes and determines perception. In both
senses, the couplet has a distinct bearing on
the problem of good and evil, for reactions
to this problem are largely a matter of per
sonal impression�viewpoint, emphasis, at
titude, and decision.
What men see is partly a matter of view
point. There can be no doubt that the view
of the world from a palace window is dif
ferent from the restrictive view from a
prison window. But here we meet a strange
fact. Often it is the "prisoner" in the palace
who sees the mud, while it is the "freeman"
in the prison who sees the stars. That is,
there is a psychological as well as a physi
cal viewpoint. The eyes are only a part of
the mechanism or process of vision; the
real seer is the mind, the self. Impressions
in the mind due to previous experience and
thinking determine what is seen. In ordi
nary language, we say that men see what
they are looking for. In psychological ex
pression, conception determines perception;
mind is active in the process of vision. The
"mud" and "stars" are first in the mind. If
"mud" is in the absorbed vision, it is in the
stream of thought. Hence it is not strange
that the expressions of the arm-chair
philosopher looking out upon life from his
comfortable position differ from those of
the afflicted. Paradoxically, the spectator is
often the pessimist.
There is logic in this seemingly illogical
contrast between the optimism of the suffer
er and the pessimism of the mere specta
tor. Sorley has shown that the sufferer of
ten has the better insight than the specta
tor who sees the whole mass of pain, ob
livious of the fact that it is not so heaped
up in actual life.
To estimate the true inwardness of suffering, we
must not go to the professional pessimist, who
counts up the grievances of humanity, as often as
not, from the vantage ground of a position of
personal comfort.*
Mill, for instance, gathered together a
pile of abstractions which shut out his view
of the good, thus committing what Dr.
Brightman has called "the unpardonable
sin" of the philosopher, "indifference to
ward any area of experience."* And per
sonal experience proves the truth of
Bowne's observation that the persons pitied
"are commonly having from their own
standpoint a pretty good time".* Bowne
adds that "the pessimistic illusion is com
pleted by attributing all the sum of pains
to the abstract man; and then all the con
ditions for the profound rhetorical woe
are fully met."
Of course, spectators differ in viewpoint
among themselves. Considering the world
as a prison of finitude and mystery, we
might say, "Two men - Mill and Royce -
looked out from behind prison bars. One
saw the mud ; the other saw the stars." And
sufferers agree as well as disagree in view
point. "Two men - Paul and Silas - looked
out from behind prison bars. Both sang
hymns; both saw the stars." That is, the
religious man sees good and evil as one
problem, grasping creation, sin, evil, re
demption, and immortality as a tmit. He
perceives meaning and purposes to which
the irreligious are blind. Naturally, he
looks up rather than down, becoming, thus,
a problem to the irreligious, who can not
understand how men with bleeding backs
can sing at midnight in jail, when men or-
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dinarily complain or curse under such cir
cumstances. It is a matter of viewpoint ; in
the eyes of Paul and Silas, they were not
prisoners of Rome, but "of the Lord".*
Then, the problem of good and evil is a
matter of emphasis. "A religious man is
one who asserts the predominance of good
in the imiverse."" Attention is determined
by interest. One in jail can be aware of his
muddy environment without concentrating
attention upon it. Prisoners unjustly con
fined and suffering have it in their power
to look either at the mud or the stars, to
determine whether they are going to "curse
God" and take the easy way out, or to wor
ship God and continue to live and fight "to
make the world a better place in which to
live", in the hope that the time will come
when righteous men will not be jailed. This
attitude of not taking evil as a finality and
of regarding the real problem of evil as
the "problem of how to overcome specific
evils through intelligent activity,"" has the
approval of such philosophers as Hocking
and Wieman. It is certainly more practi
cal than mere speculation.
But it is harder for men to sing in their
afflictions when they are self-imposed.
Those suffering intense physical pain have
testified that the worst suffering is that of
an offended conscience. Vicarious suffering,
in which there is both a revelation and a
development of character, of the best in us,
such as sympathy, is easier to bear. Our
very capacity to "rejoice with those that
rejoice" demands that we "weep with those
that weep"'. The solidarity of the race ne
cessitates that we suffer for others.
So we may choose to emphasize either
good or evil, and our choice stamps us as
either optimists or pessimists. While it may
be true that an omnipotent God can not
make evil good, even a finite man might
make good come out of evil (as freedom
out of war), even as he might make evil
come out of good (as anarchy out of free
dom). While God can "make the wrath of
man to praise Him", so man can make the
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goodness of God to curse Him (as in God's
generous gift of freedom to man). While
to some the world is best described as "a
vale of tears", Bosanquet, Sorley, and a
host of religious people take the more
cheerful and practical view that it is "A
Vale of Soul-making". If, as Mill assumed,
the goal of life is happiness, pessimism
might be justified, that is, if there were
any way of calculating the pleasures and
pains of all time, past, present and future.
But optimists choose to regard character
as the goal, being able to find a place for
evil and pain in the process that forwards
man to that goal. Proverbially, the reli
gious sufferer is optimistic, even cheerful,
putting the more fortunate on-looker to
shame. It is a matter of emphasis.
Personal attitude is a decisive factor in
the problem. Perhaps the most striking
characteristic of the world's greatest suffer
er, the Man of Sorrows, was His faith in
His Father, Pain was not the last word in
His life. Suffering intensely and unjustly,
dying an ignominious death, He transform
ed the instrument of His torture from an
emblem of shame to one of glory, illu
strating the principle that pain changes its
character, not only through spiritual vision
but through "simple pastness or remem
brance.'" And it can be said of every vic
arious sufferer, "He shall see the travail of
His soul and be satisfied.'" But the one who
"freezes the process", who sees the cruci
fixion isolated, who judges the tree by its
green fruit, may have to declare the prob
lem ultimately insolvable on the basis of
theism.
Another determinative viewpoint is that
of humility. We should beware of any de
mand, implicit or explicit, for a neat sol
ution for every problem. To the one con
scious of the limitations of human reason,
and of his dependence upon a higher wis
dom, this is irrational. With every problem
solved, he sees little, if any, room for re
ligious faith. In the eyes of many humble
Christians, the yielding to the desire on the
part of finite man "to know it all" at the
'Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Ex
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expense of faith, can only lead, as it has
lead from the beginning of the race, to evil
results. If v^e must have a solution for the
greatest problem of all, that of evil, or for
feit the general theistic conception, if not
faith in God's very existence, we constitute
ourselves "gods, knowing (completely)
good and evil". Hoffding sees no reason
why we should demand such answers at all
costs, nor "why we should fetter reason
for the sake of presumptive solutions which
only give us back our riddle in still larger
dimensions.'" A reasonable faith, i. e., a
humble attitude, will also prevent us from
trying "to put all our eggs into one basket" ;
obviously, what will explain one evil may
not explain another ; it is sufficient for each
explanation to make a contribution to the
general solution. And if we really know
only "in part" then we should suspend
judgment on a few things, at least. Would
it damage a philosopher's reputation, there
fore, to frankly confess sometimes, "I don't
know" ? Is there no place in the same world
for both faith and a wholesome measure of
agnosticism, for the humble "I don't have
the answer, but I believe that the Great
Problem Solver has it"?
This attitude of humility is very close to
that of reverence. One sufferer, baffled by
previous beliefs, unable to see the answer,
came dangerously close to spiritual ship
wreck on the rocks of charging God with
injustice; Job finally won through, how
ever, to a place of sublime faith, genuine
humility, and commendable reverence. One
is favorably impressed also by the reverence
of Royce. Nowhere, not even implicitly,
does he reproach God for the evils of the
world, and he presents reasons for "greet
ing the unknown with a cheer."
Finally, this is a matter for personal de
cision. Is life worth living? No one can an-
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swer for another, much less for the race.
Is pain the last word? Let the Man on the
Cross answer for Himself. There does
seem to be a situation in which pain is un
endurable, "namely, when vanquished, dis
honored, and abandoned, the wretch must
gasp out his life in utter solitude,"" and
yet, need one feel alone in suffering? Let
the One who seemed to pass through that
experience answer again. That God suffers
with us gives meaning to the Master's
words: "Happy are you that mourn, for
you shall be comforted." "Which is more
important, a present perfect world or future
perfect men? Let the Jobs of the world,
like R. L. Stevenson, who have found both
expression and development of character in
imperfect conditions, answer. Is character
or pleasure the true goal of life? Let both
righteous and unrighteous sufferers answer,
and then compare their answers. Is God's
will for virture "baffled" as Mill said it is?
If so, by whom? Let the awakened con
science of the evil man answer. Is freedom
a blessing or a curse? Let the writer an
swer. Realizing that morality demands
choice, and that choice, in turn, involves
an alternative (evil as well as good), and
faced with the choice of being non-existent
or a machine on the one hand, or of being
a free, moral agent on the other hand, even
at the risk of suffering in time and eternity
for a possible misuse of freedom, I would
choose existence and the gift of freedom.
If a man abused your gift of a safety-
razor to commit suicide, would you give
yourself up as a murderer? If so, do you
believe that there is a court in the land
that would convict you? The final question
is also for the reader: what are you look
ing at, the "mud" or the "stars"?
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